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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - OHIO BILLBOARD STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Ghaster Properties,Inc. v.Preston, 184 N.E.2d

552 (Ohio C.P. 1962)
A recent decision by an Ohio trial court invalidates the Ohio outdoor
advertising control statutes, jeopardizes the validity of existing municipal
sign legislation, and disqualifies Ohio from receiving extra federal highway aid.'

In Ghaster Properties, Inc. v.Preston,' three cases were con-

solidated at trial to determine the constitutional validity of the Ohio outdoor advertising control statute.' One case was an action for a declaratory judgment and an injunction against enforcement of the statute. Preston, Ohio Director of Highways, instituted the other two suits under the
statute to abate the existence of two billboards. Contending that the
prohibition against outdoor advertising signs bore no reasonable relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, the property
owners alleged the statute deprived them of their property without due
process of law. They also complained that the classifications of section
5516.02 of the Ohio Revised Code were unreasonable and, therefore, a
denial of equal protection of the laws.4 The trial court ruled that the
statutes took the owners' property without due process of law because
they bore no reasonable relation to the state police power.5
The Ohio Director of Highways pointed to highway safety as the
basis for the Ohio outdoor sign prohibition.6 This argument was not
novel. Indeed, recent cases of other jurisdictions sustaining outdoor advertising regulations postulate that signs are an attraction to drivers and,
therefore, a hazard to highway safety.'
1. Under 72 Stat. 904 (1958), as amended, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (Supp. III, 1958), a state which
maintains a program designed to regulate advertising on interstate highways may receive one
half of one per cent of the cost of an interstate highway from the federal government.
2. 184 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
3. OHIO REv. CODE § 5516.02 prohibits the erection of advertising devices within 660 feet
of an interstate highway. Advertising devices which violate § 5516.02 are classified public
and private nuisances under § 5516.04.
4. Omo REV. CODE § 5516.02 prohibits the erection of all advertising devices along interstate highways except the following: "(A) Directional or other official signs or notices that
are required or authorized by law; (B) Signs advertising the sale or lease of the property
upon which they are located; (C) Advertising devices indicating the name of the business or
profession conducted on such property or which identify the goods produced, sold, or services
rendered on such property...."
5. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 184 NE.2d 552, 555-56 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
6. Id. at 556.
7. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Barrett, 153 Cal. App. 2d 776, 315 P.2d 503 (1957); Swisher &
Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 149 la. 132, 5 So. 2d 441 (1941); Angola v. Hulbert, 130 Ind. App.
97, 162 N.E.2d 324 (1959); Schulman v. People, 11 App. Div. 2d 273, rev'd on other
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To counter this hypothesis the property owners in the Ghaster case
presented two highway safety studies showing no significant relation between highway advertising signs and highway accidents. The trial judge
held that outdoor advertising devices were not traffic safety hazards. He
concluded that
if any such relation is shown at all, it is to the effect that such devices
are beneficial to safety in that they tend to alert drivers, to keep them
actively attentive to roadway conditions and tend to prevent "highway
hypnosis." 8
The decision that billboards are neither a traffic hazard nor a public
nuisance provides the precedent for a successful assault on Ohio municipal billboard regulations. This is exactly what occurred in another jurisdiction in United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen. After considering the
Iowa and Michigan traffic accident studies, the court held that billboards
were neither a traffic hazard nor a nuisance in the City of Metuchen.'"
The trial judge also ruled favorably on the property owners' contention that arbitrary and unreasonable classification of signs in Ohio Revised Code section 5516.02 violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. This section specifically permits the erection of
signs
indicating the name of the business or profession conducted on such
property or which identify the goods produced, sold, or services rendered
on such property."
The trial judge reasoned that the permissible signs would have an identical effect on traffic safety and would create the same nuisance as signs
which have no relation to the business conducted on the property. This
observation has not been so obvious to other courts.' 2 To eliminate the
intruding billboard and to placate local businessmen, cities make this
special and "arbitrary"' 3 exception to their outdoor advertising ordinances.
grounds, 219 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1961); New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley
Motor Court, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 223, af!'d, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1961); Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932); Larchmont v. Sutton, 30 Misc.2d 245,
217 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Landau Advertising Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
387 Pa. 552, 128 A.2d 559 (1957).
8. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 184 N.E.2d 552, 557 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
9. 76 N.J. Super. 301, 184 A.2d 441 (1962).
10. Since sign regulation was but a small portion of a comprehensive zoning ordinance, the
court refused to consider an attack on the constitutionality of the small part unless the attack
be sufficient to overcome the general welfare basis of the entire zoning plan. The plaintiff
could not meet this stiff burden of proof.
11. OHIO REv. CODE § 5516.02(C).
12. See, e.g., Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944);
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952); State v.
Leonard, 124 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio C.P. 1953); Landau Advertising Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust-

ment, 387 Pa. 552, 128 A.2d 559 (1957).
13. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority v. Crystal, 2 App. Div. 2d 37, 153 N.Y.S.2d
387 (1956); Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 184 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
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Due to the Ghaster case, existing Ohio municipal zoning ordinances
which contain these exceptions are particularly vulnerable to constitutional objection.
In invalidating outdoor advertising regulations, judges conclude that
the real basis for the regulations is the promotion of beauty.1 4 Aesthetics
cannot be the sole basis for a regulation which denies an owner of the
use of his property under present Ohio law.15 As the trial judge stated
in the Ghaster case:
The police power of the State cannot be invoked for aesthetic reasons
and property rights cannot be invaded on any such basis under said
power. 16
Although the traditional view is that aesthetics cannot support regulations under the police power, certain recent cases indicate that the rule
is flexible where special aesthetic interests exist. The Florida Supreme
Court recognizes that many Florida cities possess unusual qualities of
beauty which attract tourists, and that the tourist trade is vital to the
economies of these cities. Consequently, the court has sustained ordinances
based on aesthetics which regulate the erection of advertising signs."
Another special aesthetic interest is that of a state in the natural beauty
of its "scenic highways" where the state economy depends heavily on
tourist trade.' As viewed by the Justices of the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire:
The maintenance of the natural beauty of areas along interstate highways is to be taken into account
in determining whether the police
power is properly exercised. 19
Except for these two special instances, no other court holds that
aesthetic reasons alone can support the exercise of the police power to
regulate billboards. 20 Many courts state, however, that aesthetics can be
14. See, e.g., Varney v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 Pac. 867 (1909); Santa Barbara v.
Modern Neon Sign Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 57 (Cal. App. 1961); Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting
Co., 72 N.J.L. 285 (Sup. Ct. 1905); Johnstown Poster Advertising Co. v. Borough of Portage,
27 Pa. D. & C.2d 617 (Cambria County Ct. 1961).
15. Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925). Aesthetics as an additional consideration will not invalidate the exercise of the police power.
Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.. 30 (1925).
16. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 184 N.E.2d 552, 557 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
17. Daytona Beach v. Abdo, 112 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1959); Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861
(Fla. 1953); Dade County v. Gould, 99 So. 2d 236 (Fla. Ct. App. 1957). The court reaffirmed its position on aesthetic zoning in Sunad, Inc. v. Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla.
1960), although it invalidated the ordinance for not being reasonably designed to serve its
aesthetic purpose.
18. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193
N.E. 799 (1935); Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961).
19. Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 270, 169 A.2d 762, 764 (1961).
20. Although there is an absence of judicial support for aesthetics as a basis for regulating
or prohibiting outdoor advertising, text writers have long been advocating that the view is
tenable. See, e.g., Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAw &

